Source:
Letter to CSLC Commission

Date: 12/17/04

Sholly, Brian

From: Randy Winton [rwinton@ouhsd.k12.ca.us]
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 4:40 PM
To: ogginsc@slc.ca.gov
Cc: jdannenberg@huensd.k12.ca.us; jpuglisi@mesa.k12.ca..us; garyd; ncarroll@ovsd.k12.ca.us; dtaylor@oxnardsd.org; ediaz@oxnardsd.org; sgodoy@oxnardsd.org; hpickrel@rio.k12.ca.us; pfaverty@rio.k12.ca.us; canadyr@vcss.k12.ca.us; weis@vcss.k12.ca.us; char@pjhmsw.com; maria.cobian@mail.house.gov
Subject: Comment-Cabrillo Port EIR

December 17, 2004

California State Lands Commission
100 Howe Avenue, Suite 100-South
Sacramento, CA 95825

Attention: Cy R. Oggins

Reference: Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
State Clearing House #2004021107

Since our previous correspondence the California Department of Education School Facilities Planning Division informed us that because of federal guidelines a 60-day extension of time to submit comments to be included in the Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port EIS/EIR will not be granted. L018-1

Please accept this letter as a comment.

1. The Santa Barbara Channel Alternative/Gonzales Road Pipeline (blue line) is located immediately adjacent to three existing high schools; Oxnard High School, Pacifica High School and Rio Mesa High School. L018-2

We ask that this proposed pipeline be relocated a safe distance from the above mentioned high schools in accordance with Title V, California Code of Regulations, Section 14010 (h) or that payment be made to Oxnard Union High School District to relocate these three schools.

2. The Center Road Pipeline Alternative 1 (lavender line) is located immediately adjacent to one existing high school; Rio Mesa High School. L018-3

We ask that this proposed pipeline be relocated a safe distance from the above mentioned high school in accordance with Title V, California Code of Regulations, Section 14010 (h) or payment be made to Oxnard Union High School District to relocate this school.

4. The Proposed Pipeline (red line) is located immediately adjacent to a site identified as the preferred location for a new high school on Hueneme Road. The site is identified in the Oxnard Union High School District School Site Feasibility Analysis prepared by PJHM Architects. L018-4

We ask that this proposed pipeline be relocated a safe distance from the above mentioned proposed high school site in accordance with Title V, California Code of Regulations, Section 14010 (h) or that payment be made to Oxnard Union High School District for the cost to identify a replacement site and for the cost of a suitable replacement site that would exceed the cost of this site.

5. At the Open House Session of the Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port public meeting held in Oxnard on Tuesday, November 30, 2004, representatives of Oxnard Union High School District were told by representatives of Ecology and Environment, Inc. that property owners near the proposed pipelines were notified directly about the proposed project. The notification list on hand at the public hearing did not L018-5

L018-1
All deepwater port applications fall under the authority of the Deepwater Port Act, which requires that a decision on the application be made within 330 days of the publication of the Notice of Application in the Federal Register. The Notice of Application for the Cabrillo Port Project was published in the Federal Register on January 27, 2004. Although the comment period (53 days) could not be extended at that time, a Revised Draft EIR was recirculated in March 2006 under the CEQA for an additional public review period of 60 days. Section 1.4.1 contains additional information on this topic.

Section 1.5 contains information on opportunities for public comment. After the MARAD final license hearing, the public will have 45 days to comment on the Final EIS/EIR and the license application. The Federal and State agencies will have an additional 45 days to provide comments to the MARAD Administrator. The Administrator must issue the Record of Decision within 90 days after the final license hearing. The CSLC will hold a hearing to certify the EIR and make the decision whether to grant a lease. The California Coastal Commission will also hold a hearing. Comments received will be evaluated before any final decision is made regarding the proposed Project.

L018-2
The Santa Barbara Channel/Mandalay Shore Crossing/Gonzales Road Pipeline Alternative is evaluated as an alternative in the EIS/EIR; it is not part of the proposed Project as described in Section 2.4. Section 4.2.8 contains information on safety requirements for pipelines. Section 4.13.1.3 contains information on the California Code of Regulations Title 5 section 14010.

L018-3
The Center Road Pipeline Alternative 1 is evaluated as an alternative in the EIS/EIR; it is not part of the proposed Project as described in Section 2.4. Section 4.2.8 contains information on safety requirements for pipelines. Section 4.13.1.3 contains information on the California Code of Regulations Title 5 section 14010.

L018-4
Section 4.13.1.3 contains information on standards school districts must meet to qualify for State school bond funds for the acquisition of a new school site and construction of a new school facility. Section 4.13.1.3 contains revised text regarding possible school sites, and Figure 4.13-6 shows the locations of possible school sites near Hueneme Road.

L018-5
The distribution list for the document is provided in Appendix A. The Oxnard Union High School District has been added to the list.

include Oxnard Union High School District.

Since two of the proposed pipelines are routed immediately adjacent to three existing high schools, why was Oxnard Union High School District excluded from the notification list?

L018-5 cont'd

Thank you for including this correspondence as a comment in the Cabrillo Port Deepwater Port Environmental Impact Report.

Randy Winton
Asst. Sup., Business Services
Oxnard Union High School District
805-385-2529 tel.
805-483-3069 fax.

November 12, 2004

The Honorable Steve Westly, Chair
State Controller

The Honorable Cruz Bustamante, Member
Lieutenant Governor

Mr. Tom Campbell, Member
Director of Finance

California State Lands Commission
100 Howe Avenue, Suite 100-South
Sacramento, California 95825-8202

Dear Chair Westly and Commissioners Bustamante and Campbell:

I am proud to have been elected to serve as commissioner for the Port of Hueneme, Oxnard Harbor District.

California's challenge in the 21st Century will be to find an energy source that is safe, reliable and serves the best interests of our community and state. Given the tremendous growth and potential of the Ventura County region, I feel that it is our duty to be part of the solution to California's energy shortage. We simply cannot afford more rolling blackouts and the consequences they have for our residents and our economy. Quite simply, our region, like so many in California, cannot grow without a stable energy supply.

With this in mind, it is our responsibility to fully investigate and research all aspects of available energy sources, including liquefied natural gas (or LNG), so that the public can make an informed decision based on facts, not on emotions.

In this regard, I am aware of recent proposals to address California's potential energy shortage. Any energy facilities that are approved for construction should be distant from population centers. In Ventura County, for instance, a terminal should be offshore. The terminals should also be environmentally friendly and transparent. The last thing we need is another huge power plant along the coast or blocking our coastal view.

I recognize that it is your job to decide if a facility will or will not go forward. I hope that your deliberations will result in a positive option that best meets the criteria above and improves the quality of life for our city.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Jess Herrera

cc: Paul D. Thayer, Executive Officer

L022-1
Your statement is included in the public record and will be taken into account by decision-makers when they consider the proposed Project.

RIO SCHOOL DISTRICT
3300 CORTEZ ST., OXNARD, CALIF. 93036-1309
TELEPHONE 805-485-3111
FAX 805-983-0221

December 15, 2004

Docket Management Facility
Room PL-401
400 Seventh Street SW
Washington, DC 20590-0001

California State Lands Commission
100 Howe Avenue, Suite 100-South
Sacramento, CA 95825
ogginsc@slc.ca.gov
Attention: Cy Oggins

Dear Sirs:

I am writing on behalf of the Rio School District, Oxnard, CA, in reference to the Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port draft EIS/EIR. It is apparent from the maps that have been presented of proposed routes for the pipeline associated with this project that it could pass directly in front of two of our school sites, within tens of yards of another of our school sites, and within less than a mile of three more of our school sites. Most all pipeline routes presented for this project run through the Rio School District at one point or another. L013-1

The closing date for comments for the Environmental Impact Report is close at hand (2 p.m. PST, December 20, 2004). Thus far, our district does not have enough information about the affects or potential affects that having a high pressure natural gas line of this type within a close proximity of residential neighborhoods and schools will have. The construction associated with this project will definitely impact our normal school operations; bus routes; and the families, employees, and/or students within our schools. We request that an extension of the EIS/EIR deadline for a reasonable amount of time to study this matter. On behalf of our students, we need to be able to respond with an informed decision on something with such a potential for lasting, long term impact. L013-2

Please give this request the attention appropriate, recognizing our position as guardians for the welfare of students, our families, and our employees. L013-3

Respectfully,

Hugh Pickrel, Director of Facilities

Cc: Dr. C. Weiss, Superintendent, Ventura County Schools
Dr. P. Faverty, Superintendent, Rio School District
George Shaw, School Facilities and Planning Division, California State Department of Education
Dr. R. W. Canady, Rio School District Facilities Consultant

L013-1
Section 4.13.1 discusses the proximity of the proposed pipeline routes to residences and schools. Figure 4.13-2, which has been updated, shows sensitive land uses near the proposed and alternative onshore pipeline routes in Ventura County. The proposed Center Road Pipeline route is not within 1 mile of schools in the Rio School District.

L013-2
All deepwater port applications fall under the authority of the Deepwater Port Act, which requires that a decision on the application be made within 330 days of the publication of the Notice of Application in the Federal Register. The Notice of Application for the Cabrillo Port Project was published in the Federal Register on January 27, 2004. Although the comment period (53 days) could not be extended at that time, a Revised Draft EIR was recirculated in March 2006 under the CEQA for an additional public review period of 60 days. Section 1.4.1 contains additional information on this topic.

Section 1.5 contains information on opportunities for public comment. After the MARAD final license hearing, the public will have 45 days to comment on the Final EIS/EIR and the license application. The Federal and State agencies will have an additional 45 days to provide comments to the MARAD Administrator. The Administrator must issue the Record of Decision within 90 days after the final license hearing. The CSLC will hold one or more hearings to certify the EIR and make the decision whether to grant a lease. The California Coastal Commission will also hold a hearing. Comments received will be evaluated before any final decision is made regarding the proposed Project.

Schools in the Rio School District are not located along the proposed route. Section 4.13.4 contains additional information on temporary construction disturbances from the proposed Project.

L013-3
Your statement is included in the public record and will be taken into account by decision-makers when they consider the proposed Project.

Source:
USCG Docket

Date: 12/20/04

Santa Barbara County
Air Pollution Control District

RECEIVED
12/21/04

December 20, 2004

Lt. Ken Kusano (G-MSO-5)
US Coast Guard
2100 Second Street S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

Mr. Cy Oggins,
California State Lands Commission
100 Howe Ave., Suite 100-South,
Sacramento, CA 95825-8202

SUBJECT: CABRILLO PORT DEEPWATER PORT LICENSE APPLICATION: DEIS/DEIR
Docket Number: USCG-2004-16877; State Clearinghouse Number: 2004021107

Dear Lt. Kusano and Mr. Oggins:

The Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District (SBCAPCD), the local agency with jurisdiction over the air resources of Santa Barbara County, appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the DEIS/DEIR referenced above.

Santa Barbara County is part of the South Central Coast Air Basin and will be affected by the construction and operation of this project.

Specific Comments:

Offshore Emissions During Construction; p. 4.6-13.

1. For offshore construction, Nitrogen Oxide (NO_x) emissions are projected to be 279 tons. The EIS states, "Since construction would not occur at a single location for any significant length of time, the impact of these emissions at any single location would be minor and short term." (EIS at 4.6-13.) The EIS concludes that the "net effect to local air quality probably would not be significant." The evidence does not support this analysis or conclusion. In particular, 279 tons of NO_x far exceeds all state and local levels of significance for this pollutant. Further, NO_x is a precursor to ozone pollution, which is a regional pollutant. Any emissions of NO_x in the air basin contribute to the regional ozone standard exceedances. The EIS improperly looked at this issue as only a localized impact rather than applying a regional impact perspective. This is especially significant for the South Coast and Ventura districts, which are federal ozone nonattainment areas, and the Santa

L001-1

Terence E. Dressler • Air Pollution Control Officer
260 North San Antonio Road, Suite A • Santa Barbara, CA • 93110 • www.sbcapcd.org • 805.961.8800 • 805.961.8801 (fax)

2004/L001

L001-1
Section 4.6.1.3 contains updated estimates for offshore Project construction emissions. Section 4.6.4 presents a revised discussion of the air quality impacts associated with these offshore Project construction emissions.

Barbara District, which is a state ozone nonattainment area. Therefore, the EIS should include an impact analysis for offshore construction emissions that recognizes this is a temporary but still significant air pollution environmental impact.

2. The EIS offers no mitigation analysis for offshore construction emissions and instead simply states that the applicant "shall comply with the Ventura and Los Angeles Counties' prescription for offshore construction emissions reductions as set forth in the conformity analysis." (EIS at p. 4.614.) The EIS has, in effect, completely deferred on this issue. This is a significant omission from the EIS for two reasons. First, it fails to satisfy the NEPA requirement that any EIS must provide a detailed statement of the environmental impacts of the action, possible alternatives, and measures to mitigate adverse effects of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). By completely deferring the mitigation analysis issues to the conformity analysis, the EIS fails to comply with NEPA. Second, due to the nature of the conformity rules, the outcome (such as applicable mitigation) cannot be known at this time. L001-2

Further, it is clear that the proposed LNG project is not in either the Ventura or South Coast Clean Air Act state implementation plan ("SIP"). Therefore, there is no "emission budget" in the SIP for this project. Further, since it far exceeds the levels of significance for NO_x in Ventura, South Coast or Santa Barbara districts, the project's construction emissions will interfere with the attainment of the federal and state ozone standards for each of these districts. L001-3

Stationary Source Emissions During Offshore Operations; p. 4.6-14.

3. The EIS states that the applicant will comply with the Ventura County APCD new source review rule for stationary source emissions and provide offsets. Any EIS must provide a detailed statement of the environmental impacts of the action, possible alternatives, and measures to mitigate adverse effects of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The EIS does not identify the projects that will provide offsets or whether offsets for this project are even available. Further, identification of offset sources will determine if other issues need to be addressed, such as distance discounting. L001-4

4. The EIS also does not identify which emissions from offshore operations are not subject to Ventura APCD's rules. For emissions that are exempt from offsets or exempt from permit under Ventura's rules, the EIS must provide an impact analysis, including an alternatives analysis, of this air pollution. L001-5

L001-2
Section 4.6.4 contains revised information on impacts for offshore construction. A Draft General Conformity Determination was issued in March 2006 with a 30-day public comment period. The Applicant has made commitments to use engines in onshore construction equipment that would comply with the USEPA's Tier 2, 3 or 4 emission standards. This would result in de minimis emissions levels; therefore, MARAD and the USCG have determined that the General Conformity Rule no longer applies and a General Conformity Determination is not required. Section 4.6.2 and Appendix G4 contain additional information on this topic.

L001-3
See the response to Comment L001-2.

L001-4
The USEPA has made a preliminary determination, on which the lead agencies must rely, that the FSRU should be permitted in the same manner as sources on the Channel Islands that are part of Ventura County. Section 4.6.2 contains an updated discussion of relevant regulatory requirements.

L001-5
The Project has been modified since issuance of the October 2004 Draft EIS/EIR. See Section 1.4.2 for a summary of Project changes. Section 4.6.2 contains information on the regulatory requirements for Project operations. Section 4.6.4 contains a revised discussion of the air quality impacts associated with emissions from offshore Project operations. Section 4.6.5 contains information on the air quality impacts associated with Project alternatives.

Use of New Vessels; EIS p. 4.6-16.

5. The EIS estimates that LNG vessels will emit 106 tons per year of NO_x. (Table 4.6-3.) The EIS later states that the "LNG carriers are internationally flagged and, therefore, are not subject to United States (U.S.) marine vessel regulations." (EIS at p. 4.6-16.) The EIS goes on to state that since the vessels are powered by LNG, emissions will be minimized to the maximum extent possible without the addition of control equipment. The EIS then states "O_3 related emissions generated by mobile sources would not likely contribute to existing violations of Federal or State O_3 standards; therefore, this impact on air resources is less than significant." (EIS at p. 4.6-17.)

   The analysis and conclusions of the EIS on impacts from vessel emissions is not supported by the evidence and is completely untenable for the following reasons:

   a. The EIS on this issue fails to recognize that ozone is a regional pollutant and the emission of NO_x anywhere in the air basin of an ozone nonattainment area adversely affect the air quality of that nonattainment area. There is no basis to say, as the EIS does, that it "not likely" that such emissions will contribute to existing violations of Federal and State standards. L001-6

   b. LNG vessel emissions of 100 tons of NO_x exceed the significance thresholds for each of the 3 affected districts. In any of these districts, 100 tons of NO_x qualifies as a major source of air pollution subject to mitigation under district rules or alternatively requires a conformity analysis. Both thresholds clearly show that in excess of 100 tons of NO_x should be considered significant under NEPA. L001-7

   c. Even though the EIS is (apparently) noting EPA has declined to regulate foreign flagged vessels as non-road engines under Section 213 of the Clean Air Act (as recently upheld in *Bluewater Network v. EPA* 362 U.S. App. D.C. 37 (D.C. Cir. 2004)), the EIS must still comply with NEPA and provide a detailed statement of the environmental impacts of the action, possible alternatives, and measures to mitigate adverse effects of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This obligation under NEPA includes a responsibility to analyze the adverse impacts caused by the emissions from LNG vessels, even if they are foreign flagged. The EIS does not suggest that a conformity analysis will be performed for the emissions from the LNG vessels. As stated below, the District believes such an analysis is appropriate. If a conformity analysis is not performed, however, such an omission underscores to an even greater degree the L001-8 L001-9

2004/L001

L001-6
Section 4.6.1.2 has been revised to provide an expanded discussion of the potential transport of offshore air pollutant emissions to onshore areas due to meteorological conditions. Section 4.6.4 contains a revised discussion of the air quality impacts associated with emissions from offshore Project operations.

L001-7
Impact AIR-5 in Section 4.6.4 presents a revised discussion of this topic.

L001-8
Section 4.6.2 presents a summary of the rules and regulations applicable to Project operations. Impacts AIR-5 and AIR-8 in Section 4.6.4 present revised discussions of the air quality impacts associated with Project vessel emissions during FSRU operation.

L001-9
The Draft General Conformity Determination was issued in March 2006 with a 30-day public comment period. However, based on equipment changes proposed by the Applicant, MARAD, and the USCG has determined that the General Conformity Rule does not apply. Appendix G4 contains additional information on this topic.

importance of fully analyzing LNG vessel emissions impacts in the EIS pursuant to NEPA.

d. The emissions from the LNG vessels must also be subject to a conformity analysis, as they are indirect sources of air pollution from this project. Indirect emissions are defined to be those emissions of a criteria pollutant or its precursors that "(1) Are caused by the Federal action, but may occur later in time and/or may be farther removed in distance from the action, e.g., but are reasonable foreseeable and (2) The Federal agency can practicably control and will maintain control due to a continuing program responsibility of the Federal agency." (58 FR 63248.) The emissions from the LNG vessels are clearly foreseeable. Further, the Coast Guard will continue to have regulatory jurisdiction over these vessels after the project commences operation. Therefore, a conformity analysis that includes emissions from the LNG vessels is appropriate.

Onshore Construction Emissions.

6. For onshore construction, NO_x emissions are projected to be 171 tons. (Table 4.6-2.) The EIS fairly notes that these emissions will be temporary, but incorrectly concludes that such impacts will be "minor." The evidence does not support this conclusion. In particular, 171 tons of NO_x far exceeds all state and local levels of significance for this pollutant. Further, NO_x is a precursor to ozone pollution, which is a regional pollutant. Any emissions of NO_x in the air basin contribute to the regional ozone standard exceedances. L001-10

7. As with offshore construction emissions, the EIS completely defers any analysis on onshore construction emissions because a conformity analysis will be prepared. (EIS at p. 4.6-17.) Again, the EIS has improperly deferred this issue. This is a significant omission from the EIS for two reasons. First, it fails to satisfy the NEPA requirement that any EIS must provide a detailed statement of the environmental impacts of the action, possible alternatives, and measures to mitigate adverse effects of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). By completely deferring the mitigation analysis issues to the conformity analysis, the EIS fails to comply with NEPA. Second, due to the nature of the conformity rules, the outcome (such as applicable mitigation) cannot be known at this time. L001-11

Further, it is clear that the proposed LNG project is not in either the Ventura or SCAQMD Clean Air Act state implementation plan ("SIP"). Therefore, there is no "emission budget" in the SIP for this project. Further, since it far exceeds the levels of significance for NO_x in Ventura, South Coast or Santa Barbara districts, the project's construction emissions will interfere with the L001-12

L001-10
The Project has been modified since issuance of the October 2004 Draft EIS/EIR. See Impact AIR-1 in Section 4.6.4 for an updated analysis on this topic.

L001-11
MARAD and the USCG have determined that the General Conformity Rule does not apply to the Project. Section 4.6.2 and Appendix G4 include information on this topic. Section 4.6.4 presents a revised discussion of the air quality impacts associated with onshore Project construction emissions and proposed mitigation measures.

L001-12
See the response to Comment L001-11.

2004/L001

attainment of the federal and state ozone standards for each of these districts.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the EIR/EIS for this important project. If you need additional information on these comments please call our County Counsel, William Dillon at 805.568.2950.

Sincerely,

Bobbie Bratz

Bobbie Bratz
Public Information and Community Programs Supervisor

cc: TEA Chron File
William Dillon, Deputy County Counsel
Barry Wallerstein, Director, South Coast Air Quality Management District
Mike Villegas, Director, Ventura County Air Quality Management District
Alison Dettmer, California Coastal Commission

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Source:
USCG Docket

Date: 12/20/04

December 20, 2004

Lieutenant Ken Kusano)G-MSO-5)
U.S. Coast Guard
2100 Second Street, SE
Washington, DC 20593-0001

Cy Oggins
California State Lands Commission
100 Howe Ave.
Suite 100—South
Sacramento, CA 95825-8202

RE: Comments on the DEIR/S for the Proposed Cabrillo Port LNG Terminal

Gentlemen:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the environmental review of this proposed project. Our comments herein reflect the following topics:

First, we concur with the conclusion that the alternative location of Ventura Flats is environmentally inferior to the proposed project for several factors, including some not addressed in the draft environmental review.

Second, we are very concerned about the precedent that the methods used, and conclusions derived in the analysis of impacts to public safety may have on the treatment of risk in environmental reviews in the future. The treatment of risk in this environmental documental appears to depart significantly from many risk analyses performed for projects in this region, including the unprecedented move to house the supporting information of the risk analysis in a confidential document. We do not dispute that security strategies and tactics should remain confidential; however, there is no good reason to reveal the substance of the risk analysis in the DEIR/S to peer and public review. The citizens of this region deserve better. L004-1 L004-2

Third, we are concerned that the cumulative impact analysis, particularly having to do with the potential for more than one LNG terminal in this region, is inadequate to properly inform decision-makers and the public. L004-3

Lastly, I wish to endorse the comments submitted by the Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District. L004-4

L004-1
The Independent Risk Assessment (IRA) has been updated since issuance of the October 2004 Draft EIS/EIR. The lead agencies directed preparation of the current IRA, and the U.S. Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories independently reviewed it, as discussed in Section 4.2 and Appendix C.

Section 4.2.7.6 and the IRA (Appendix C1) discuss the models and assumptions used and the verification process. Sandia National Laboratories (Appendix C2) concluded that the models used were appropriate and produced valid results.

L004-2
The IRA was determined to contain sensitive security information (SSI), and it was not made available to the general public; however, it was available for review by Federal, State, and local agency staffs and officials with safety and security responsibilities and clearances. The results of the 2004 IRA were summarized in the October 2004 Draft EIS/EIR.

With the exception of certain SSI in Appendix D, the entire text of the IRA and its supporting documents are included in Appendix C. As noted in the preface to Appendix D (Collision Analysis) to the IRA, "(t)he complete report is available for review by Federal, State, and local agency staffs and elected officials with safety and security responsibilities and clearances."

L004-3
The cumulative impacts analysis has been conducted to account for those projects that are reasonable and foreseeable in accordance with NEPA and the State CEQA Guidelines. See 40 CFR 1508.7 and section 15130 of the State CEQA Guidelines, with which the document complies.

L004-4
Your statement is included in the public record and will be taken into account by decision-makers when they consider the proposed Project.

Our specific comments are attached for your consideration. Please contact Mr. Doug Anthony of my department at (805) 568-2046 should you have any questions. L004-4 cont'd

Sincerely,

Valentin Alexeeff
Director

Comments on the DEIR/S for the Proposed Port Cabrillo LNG Terminal

General Comments on Section 4.2, Public Safety: Hazards and Risk Analysis

(1) The proposed Cabrillo Port LNG Terminal may or may not pose a risk to public safety onshore; however, we are concerned, as many others are that the risk analysis departs in several important ways from conventional risk analysis. A recent study by ABS Consulting, prepared for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, suggests different conclusions and, in some cases, different assumptions for modeling vapor cloud dispersion distances (e.g., reasonable worst-case atmospheric stability and wind speed). L004-5

Such departures may be precedent setting and, therefore, must be appropriately peered reviewed by the scientific community before used. We understand that Sandia Laboratories currently is preparing a report that would support the assumptions and methods employed in the risk analysis for the Cabrillo Port LNG terminal. That report, unfortunately, will not be sufficient if the basic premises and models have not already undergone sufficient peer review in the scientific community. We recommend a review of the assumptions used in this risk analysis by the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. The stated assumptions of wind profile and wind speed, for example, contradict several risk analyses prepared for releases of hazardous materials, which find that *Class F* stability and slower wind speeds lead to the reasonable worst-case (largest) hazard zones. L004-6

(2) Recent studies about assessing the consequences of releases from LNG carriers note the shortcomings in our understanding about such releases inhibits precise estimates of adverse consequences, due to *"variability in actual incident circumstances as well as uncertainty inherent in the methods used."*[1] One study informs us that: *"In the long term, additional research will need to be performed to develop more refined models, and additional large-scale spill tests would be useful for providing better data for validation of models."*[2] Others are proposing several LNG terminals along the California coast, and there is the potential that some or all of these would be considered for approval before more precise estimates of consequences. L004-7

(3) We urge the Coast Guard to reformat risk analysis so that it may receive a full public viewing without being subject to confidentiality restrictions. Distribute a redacted version if you must to achieve this disclosure. As it stands now, the confidentiality of the risk analysis combined with contradictory risk analysis recently performed for FERC by ABS Consulting and other studies, and the change in basic assumptions and methods for calculating hazard zones renders the credibility of this DEIS highly questionable. Citizens of California deserve more. L004-8

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[1] ABS Consulting, *Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving Releases from Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers,* (Washington, D.C., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, May 13, 2004), page iii. Also, Pitblado, R.M., *et. al.*, *Consequences of LNG Marine Incidents* (Houston: Det Norske Veritas (USA) Inc., paper presented at CCPS Conference Orlando June 29-July1, 2004).

[2] *Ibid,* page

L004-5
The Project is regulated by the USCG and MARAD under the authority of the Deepwater Port Act. FERC's regulations are prescriptive and standardized to address the general siting of onshore LNG terminals. In contrast, due to various different designs of deepwater ports, the USCG conducts site-specific independent risk and consequence analyses using the most recent guidance and modeling techniques. The guidance used for Cabrillo Port is Sandia National Laboratories' "Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water." This report recommends a framework for analyses of large LNG spills onto water. It was prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and an external peer review panel evaluated the analyses, conclusions, and recommendations presented.

L004-6
The Independent Risk Assessment (IRA) has been updated since issuance of the October 2004 Draft EIS/EIR. The lead agencies directed the preparation of the current IRA, and the U.S. Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories independently reviewed it. See Section 4.2, Appendix C1, and Appendix C2 for additional information on third-party verification of the IRA.

L004-7
To date, there has never been a large spill of LNG to water. Conducting a large LNG spill to validate the models would result in adverse environmental consequences. However, models are commonly validated using experimental data. Section 2.3.4.2 of Appendix C1 contains information on tests executed by the U.S. Department of Energy and the calibration/verification of the Fire Dynamics Simulator model used in the Independent Risk Assessment. Appendix C1 provides additional information on this topic, and Appendix C2, prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories, contains information on the review and assessment of the models used.

L004-8
See the response to Comment L004-2.

Specific Comments on Section 4.2, Public Safety: Hazards and Risk Analysis

Page 4.2-16, scenario groups. Please explain why a BLEVE would not be considered among the worst-case credible consequences; i.e., why one or more tanks on the FSRU and the LNG transport vessel would not be subject to external source of fire that would then, potentially, lead to a BLEVE. BLEVEs are typically modeled for onshore storage of LPG and NGL of significantly lower volumes than what would be stored in the FSRU. If the BLEVE scenario does qualify as credible, then please model the results. In doing so, please note that FEMA, et. al., report that incidents involving BLEVE with rail tank cars witnessed individual fragments that have traveled as far as 4,000-5,000 feet from the tank car. L004-9

Page 4.2-19, second and third assumptions (lines 12-22). Please reconcile the assumptions stated in these lines – i.e., that Class *D* atmospheric stability and faster wind speeds 6 meters per second (m/s), result in larger hazard zones than Class *F* atmospheric stability and 2 m/s. Most risk analyses use both average and stable wind profiles and speeds when modeling vapor cloud dispersions.[3] For example, risk analyses prepared for several oil and gas development projects offshore Santa Barbara County, including onshore pipelines and processing facilities, indicate that model runs with the more stable wind profiles – i.e., stability of Class *F* and speed of 2 meters per second (m/s) – result in significantly larger hazard zones than those model runs with average conditions – i.e., stability of Class *D* and speed of 5 m/s.[4] The underlying logic is that more stable conditions and lower wind speeds are much slower in dispersing the vapor cloud below ½ LFL and harmful toxic dosages, thereby allowing the cloud to spread further distances. L004-10

More to the point, recent modeling of LNG spills over water show the downwind distance of a vapor cloud (to its lower flammability limit (LFL)) to be considerably larger under Class *F* and 2 m/s than Class *D* and 5 or 6 m/s. Consider, for example, Pitblado, *et. al.*, which modeled dispersion distances to LFL under *F; 2 m/s* and *D; 5 m/s*, and found the former to be considerably larger (*F; 2 m/s* = 830 m versus *D; 5 m/s* 380 m for a release from a hole of 250 mm above sea; and F; 2 m/s = 1,400 m versus *d; 5 m/s* = 920 m for a release from a hole of 750 mm above sea).[5]

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[3] See, for example, Stricoff, R. Scott, "Safety risk Analysis and Process Safety Management: Principles and Practices," in *eds:* Kolluru, Rao V., et. al., *Rick Assessment and Management Handbook,* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996), page 8.45, "*Meteorologic data are needed because weather conditions can greatly affect the way a release spreads. … Many risk analyses employ at least two weather conditions: one stable and the other representative of average conditions.*"

[4] See, for example, Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Point Arguello Field and Gaviota Processing Facility Area Study and Chevron/Texaco Development Plan EIR/S: Technical Appendix O – System Safety and Reliability,* (Santa Barbara: County of Santa Barbara Energy Division, 1984), pages 6-48 and 6-49. In this environmental document modelled pipeline ruptures at several locations and continually concluded downwind distances and maximum widths of vapor clouds to be substantially larger at F; 2 m/s than D; 5 m/s (e.g., 5,700 m vs. 1,200 m for downwind and 260 m vs. 130 m for width). Also, Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Union Oil Project / Exxon Project Shamrock and Central Santa Maria Basin Area Study EIS/EIR: Technical Appendix M – System Safety and Reliability,* (available at Santa Barbara: County of Santa Barbara Energy Division, 1985), pages 4-62 and 4-64.

[5] Pitblado, R.M., *et. al., Op. Cit.,* page 15. These authors note that modeling of downwind distances with *F; 2 m/s* conditions has more uncertainty than *d; 5 m/s*, due to lack of validation data and the slower speed may allow sufficient warming of the cloud to carry it upwards. But these are all uncertainties that, until more is known, should not eliminate use of *f; 2 m/s* for purposes of this analysis.

L004-9
The California Energy Commission's 2004 document, *International and National Efforts to Address the Safety and Security Risks of Importing Liquefied Natural Gas: A Compendium,* states, "LNG will not support a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), because it is exceedingly cold and is stored at ambient pressure in very strong tanks."

BLEVEs involving rail cars and other storage of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) have occurred with devastating blast forces and ejection of structural fragments to large distances. A BLEVE requires that the container maintain its integrity under very high internal pressures, i.e., until exposure to heat-induced increases in container internal pressure combines with thermal weakening of the container shell to produce a high-pressure failure. Unlike LPG, LNG is stored as a cold liquid at approximately atmospheric pressure in containers that are not pressure vessels; vessel failure would be expected at relatively low internal pressures, especially with concomitant thermal weakening due to fire exposure. BLEVE scenarios were therefore not considered credible.

L004-10
Section 4.1.8.5 contains information on existing wind conditions at the offshore Project site. Figure 2.1-2 depicts the maximum area from the FSRU in any direction that could be affected in the event of an accident; impacts would not reach the shoreline. Section 2.3.5.3 of the Independent Risk Assessment (see Appendix C1) contains information on the environmental, meteorological and ocean conditions that were considered in the modeling of LNG spills and dispersion.

Additionally, ABS Consulting, under contract to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently modeled a vapor cloud dispersion from a hypothetical offshore spill of LNG of substantially smaller volume than assumed in this DEIR/S and found substantially larger downwind distance to LFL (3,900 m) using *f; 2 m/s*, than this DEIR/S.[6]

Page 4.2-22, lines 13-22. Please explain what affect the explicit and seemingly erroneous omission of rapid evaporation has on the hazard zone and why this zone would be smaller if rapid evaporation, which most analyses and trials demonstrate would occur, did in fact result shortly after the LNG lands on the ocean's surface. L004-11

Page 4.2-24, lines 8-16. Please model dispersions to ½ LFL to ensure consideration of a reasonable worst-case hazard zone and consistency with methodologies conventionally applied for modeling gas releases from offshore oil/gas platforms and pipelines. Vapor-cloud dispersion models for oil and gas projects offshore typically model flammable (not explosive) risk to ½ LFL. As noted by former consulting firm Arthur D. Little, Inc. *"In principle, it is not possible to ignite a vapor cloud whose concentration is below the lower flammable limit (LFL); however, in a dispersing cloud the concentration will fluctuate due to atmospheric turbulence. Therefore, one-half the LFL was selected as the flammable dispersion criterion."*[7] This logic has been supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Transportation, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as follows: *"The concentration of a gas or vapor at any specific point downwind will fluctuate about an average value due to atmospheric turbulence even if all other factors that can influence vapor dispersion phenomena remain unchanged. ... In the case of flammable gases or vapors, however, it is necessary to make a distinction between that portion of a cloud or plume that can burn and that portion that may explode, and this requires consideration of peak to average concentrations at downwind locations. Without getting into more technical details, suffice it to say that a cloud or plume has the potential to burn out to the boundaries of the area encompassed by a gas or vapor concentration that is approximately one-half the LFL. The area subject to explosion, however, is better via use of the actual LFL value."*[8] This logic is also supported in a recent study by ABS Consulting, contracted by FERC to examine LNG spill consequence modeling. *"For flammable vapor dispersion distance calculations, the level of concern is sometimes taken as the LFL, and there is some regulatory basis for this choice in EPA's risk management program rule (40 CFR 68). However, the level of concern is also often defined as ½ the LFL to account for localized pockets of higher gas concentrations that may occur in an actual release. Use of ½ the LFL for LNG is also supported by 49 CFR 193, which specifies use of an average gas concentration in air of 2.5 percent for onshore exclusion zones."*[9] L004-12

[6] ABS Consulting, *Op. Cit.*, page 39.
[7] Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Point Arguello Field and Gaviota Processing Facility Area Study and Chevron/Texaco Development Plans EIR/S,* 1984 (prepared for County of Santa Barbara, U.S. Minerals Management Service, California State Lands Commission, and California Secretary of Environmental Affairs), page R-5.11-9.
[8] Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Transportation, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures,* page 12-71.
[9] ABS Consulting, *Op. Cit.*, page 26.

L004-11
"Rapid Phase Transition (RPT)" in Section 4.2.7.2 and Appendix C1 discuss this topic.

L004-12
The criteria given in 49 CFR 193 are based on the use of Gaussian models, which have inherent limitations especially when used on lighter than air gases such as methane. The specified use of half LFL is related to the Reynolds averaging time as it affects mixing. The computational fluid dynamics model used in the IRA does not have these inherent limitations because it has a different numeric basis and produces more accurate results that include uneven mixing. Therefore, using half LFL would be overly conservative and is unnecessary. Neither the regulation nor the criteria it specifies are applicable to the proposed Project, which is federally regulated by MARAD and the USCG and not by FERC.

We note that, instead of using ½ LFL, other analysts validate model results against actual LNG water spill trials, leading to adjustments in assumption to reduce under- and over-predicting tendencies of the model. Pitblado, for example, adjusted the assumption from LFL to 85% of LFL to tweak the PHAST model results, based on ten LNG trials (i.e., releases of LNG over water).[10]

Page 4.2-28, Table 4.2.3-3. This table raises some interesting questions when comparing the "worst-case credible releases" against the "other cases modeled." First, it tells us, contrary to other risk analyses, that the more stable atmospheric conditions and slower wind speeds result in a much smaller hazard zone (1000 m), even though analyses of raw gas releases offshore tell us just the opposite. It also tells us that the smallest quantity of LNG released (Case #1 at 50,000 m^3) results in a larger downwind hazard zone (1880 m) than a full release (100,000 m^3). Yet, a release of yet larger volumes considered under terrorist attack, has the reverse effect (i.e., 300,000 m^3). Please explain clearly why the differences with other modeling results and how release of half the volume of LNG results in a larger downwind dispersion before reaching LFL. L004-12 cont'd

Also reconcile these results with ABS Consulting's modeling results. Specifically, ABS found a release of a substantially smaller volume of LNG over water to result in much larger hazard zones (i.e., 12,500 m^3 of LNG reaches downwind distances of 3,900 m to LFL, and 5,500 m to ½ of LFL under Class *F* stability and 2 m/s wind speed. Table 4.2.3-3 in this DEIR/S, on the other hand, models a release of 100,000 m of LNG that reaches only 1,000 m under the same weather conditions. We recognize that, due to lack of validation data and some thought that slower wind speeds would lead to uplift of the cloud, modeling results under Class *F* stability and 2 m/s wind speeds entails some uncertainties and, therefore, room for disagreement among experts. The California Environmental Quality Act, however, requires the a EIR include discussion of this uncertainty and report both conclusions rather than simply choosing the conclusion that provides the least projected impact. On this basis, failure to include ABS Consulting's model results would render the EIR inadequate.

Pages 4.2-32 & 33. Incident rates decreased from the 1970-1984 period to post-1984 (Table 4.2.4-2), which is acknowledged in the analysis as partly a result of changes in reporting requirements, and may also reflect changes in pipeline characteristics and operating practices after 1984. The current table suggests that the number of accidents from all causes other than third-party damage has increased in 2000-2003 as compared to1990-1999, while third-party damage incidents have decreased slightly. Overall the accident frequency has increased; while the proportion of third-party damage incidents has decreased. Therefore, it would be helpful to expand the table to cover 1984-2004 and to show incidents by cause in 4 or 5 year periods. That would give a better picture of how incident rates and causes have changed in recent times. L004-13

Pages 4.2-35 to 4.2-37. (1) The risk analysis in Table 4.2.4-4 and associated text is derived from aggregated accident data, including offshore, onshore, urban, and rural pipelines. We understand this approach is commonly taken; however, in this case the conclusions drawn from the aggregated data may not accurately represent offshore pipelines, based on other, more specific L004-14

[10] Pitblado, *et. al., Op. Cit.*, page 12.

L004-13
"Historical Natural Gas Pipeline Incident Data" in Section 4.2.8.1 contains revised text on this topic.

L004-14
"Estimated Pipeline Safety Risks" in Section 4.2.8.1 contains revised text on this topic. Table 4.2-10 has been updated with more recent data.

data. For example, our analysis of the D.O.T. database indicates that from 1984-2001, only about 3% of the transmission pipelines were offshore,[11] yet offshore pipeline accidents accounted for 17.2% of all incidents, 24.6% of property damage, and 28.2% of fatalities.[12] Therefore, we recommend that the analysis be augmented with a focused analysis of accidents from pipelines that are comparable to those proposed.

(2) Based on the above comment, the average fatality rate for offshore pipelines alone could be 1×10^{-4} per pipeline mile; hence, the fatality rate for the 17-mile offshore pipeline segment may be on the order of 2×10^{-3}. Furthermore, in some years the rate is much higher, and the rate does not include accidents in populated onshore areas. Such a risk profile could fall well within the "red area" of the Santa Barbara County Public Fatality Risk Spectrum, depending upon the number of projected fatalities. L004-15

(3) The assumption is made in this section that due to improvements in pipeline safety a new pipeline would have many fewer incidents than occurred historically. Based on the above comment, it is unclear that incident rates have improved for pipelines comparable to those proposed, particularly offshore pipelines. (For example: Is anchor drag a major cause of ruptures in large diameter offshore pipelines? Has the rate from this cause decreased, and what is the estimated current occurrence rate?) Please provide support for the assumption that future incident rates will be lower than those of the recent past for pipelines comparable to the proposed ones.

Pages 4.2-37 and 4.2-38, lines 11-7. Santa Barbara County's risk significance thresholds are, as reported, 1×10^{-5} for a single fatality; however, they are much less tolerant as the number of fatalities increases and are not based on a fatality-per-mile unit of measure, as incorrectly reported. We believe that the method of using Santa Barbara County's thresholds in this draft is inappropriate. The threshold is explicitly designed to be used with risk curves plotted onto the thresholds to consider not just one fatality, but several fatalities. We suggest that the consultant either plot the risk curves to show multiple fatalities, and also to use the County's threshold for injury as well. If not, we suggest that the current use of the threshold be deleted to avoid misrepresentation of the threshold. L004-16

Page 4.2-38. Table 4.2.4-6 should be considerably revised to illustrate reasonable accurate and reasonable comparison. First of all, there is no scientific merit to judging gas pipeline safety by comparing gas pipeline incidents with motor vehicle accidents, aviation accidents, etc. We concur that the gas pipeline industry has a good safety record; however, this record should and can be supported by (1) comparing the public risk of injuries and fatalities from natural gas pipeline accidents to the public risk from releases of other hazardous materials from other modes of transport; and (2) making the comparison on accidents per miles, or better yet, risk per mile. L004-17

Additionally, the comparison between the number of fatalities from transmission and distribution pipelines (lines 14-18) is inaccurate: While there were five times more accidents from L004-18

[11] "Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Annual Mileage," Office of Pipeline Safety website, accessed 12/20/04, < http://ops.dot.gov/stats/GTANNUAL2.HTM >
[12] "Natural Gas Transmission Incident Data - mid 1984 to 2001," Office of Pipeline Safety website, accessed 12/20/04 , < http://ops.dot.gov/IA98.htm >

L004-15
Section 4.2.8.1 contains revised and updated information on pipeline incidents. Table 4.2-2 shows pipeline incident, injury, and facility trends from 1986 to 2005. AM PS-3a contains information on more stringent pipeline design criteria for offshore pipelines. AM PS-4a contains information on Class 3 Pipeline Design Criteria.

L004-16
Section 4.2 has been revised because a different endpoint was used for the analysis as recommended by Sandia National Laboratories.

L004-17
The frequency of pipeline accidents and transportation accidents provides a context for the public safety risk analysis.

L004-18
Section 4.2.8.1 and Impact PS-4 contain revised information on this topic.

distribution lines, there also were an average of 4.7 times more miles of distribution lines in operation during the years analyzed. Such comparisons need to be made according to the annual fatality rate per mile of operating pipelines.

Specific Comments on Section 4.20, Cumulative Impact Analysis

This section errs by not addressing cumulative impacts of any of the alternatives listed in section 3.4 as alternatives that have been evaluated in the DEIS/R. We specifically request that the environmental document address the alterative location offshore Rincon (Ventura Flats) as follows. Address the cumulative probability/frequency of a collision between an LNG tanker and other large ships, considering number of LNG tanker trips across shipping lanes from both the Crystal Energy project at Platform Grace and the Ventura Flats alternative for this project. L004-19

Secondly, this section does not adequately analyze the capacity of the existing onshore pipeline and storage system to handle incoming gas from (1) the proposed project, (2) the Crystal Energy project, plus (3) increased gas production from currently undeveloped leases. The document must consider cumulative impacts if that infrastructure is insufficient and requires expansion. L004-20

L004-19
Section 4.3.5 addresses the impact on marine traffic of a potential facility at Ventura Flats. Section 4.20.3.3 contains revised information on the cumulative impact on marine traffic, including impacts from the potential Clearwater Port project.

L004-20
The capacity of the existing onshore pipeline and storage system to handle incoming gas from the proposed Clearwater Port project would be more appropriately addressed in the environmental analysis for that project. Increased gas production from currently undeveloped leases is not reasonably foreseeable.

VENTURA COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OFFICE

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December 16, 2004

Docket Management Facility
Room PL-401
400 Seventh Street SW
Washington, DC 20590-0001

Subject: ***Request for Extension of Public Comment/Study Period Regarding Proposed Cabrillo Port Offshore Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project***

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing you today on an issue of great concern regarding the safety of students and staff at school sites which may be affected by the proposed Cabrillo Port Offshore LNG Project. It is my understanding that the deadline for public comments on the draft Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Study is December 20, 2004. It has come to my attention that school districts and their attendant sites adjacent to the proposed underground pipeline from the offshore project have not been given appropriate consideration as affected agencies in this process. As a result, I am requesting an extension of no less than 60 days to the public comment/study period so that appropriate amendments can be made to the EIR/EIS in order to reflect the potential negative impact on our schools and students in connection with this project. **L021-1**

Specifically, this project includes routing an underground 36-inch pipeline pressured at over 1,000 PSI which will border existing school sites in the Hueneme, Mesa, Ocean View, Rio, Oxnard Elementary and Oxnard Union High School Districts, which serve several thousand students in Ventura County. According to the California Department of Education's *(CDE)* School Facilities Planning Unit Guidelines for School Siting Criteria, a pipeline of this size would require – at a minimum – 1,500 to 2,000 foot setbacks from school property. Based upon this criteria, students at selected sites may be placed in an extremely unsafe situation, and proposed new school sites needed for enrollment growth would be disallowed by the CDE based upon the proximity of the pipeline. An extension of the comment/study period will allow for the necessary analysis of the pipeline location based upon CDE criteria and existing school site locations. **L021-2**

I was extremely disappointed to learn that the affected school districts with schools within 300 feet of the proposed pipeline were evidently not notified as affected property owners of the EIR and comment period as is required by law. For this reason alone, it is imperative that an extension be granted so that a careful study can be performed relative to both present and proposed school sites in proximity to the pipeline component of this project. In the interest of students, staff and the community, it is my expectation that you will take prompt and necessary action with regard to this request. **L021-3**

L021-1
All deepwater port applications fall under the authority of the Deepwater Port Act, which requires that a decision on the application be made within 330 days of the publication of the Notice of Application in the Federal Register. The Notice of Application for the Cabrillo Port Project was published in the Federal Register on January 27, 2004. Although the comment period (53 days) could not be extended at that time, a Revised Draft EIR was recirculated in March 2006 under the CEQA for an additional public review period of 60 days. Section 1.4.1 contains additional information on this topic.

Section 1.5 contains information on opportunities for public comment. After the MARAD final license hearing, the public will have 45 days to comment on the Final EIS/EIR and the license application. The Federal and State agencies will have an additional 45 days to provide comments to the MARAD Administrator. The Administrator must issue the Record of Decision within 90 days after the final license hearing. The CSLC will hold a hearing to certify the EIR and make the decision whether to grant a lease. The California Coastal Commission will also hold a hearing. Comments received will be evaluated before any final decision is made regarding the proposed Project.

L021-2
Section 4.13.1 discusses the proximity of the proposed pipeline routes to residences and schools. Figure 4.13-2 shows sensitive land uses near the proposed and alternative onshore pipeline routes in Ventura County. Section 4.13.1.3 contains information on standards school districts must meet to qualify for State school bond funds for the acquisition of a new school site and construction of a new school facility. Section 4.13.1.3 contains revised text regarding possible school sites. Figure 4.13-6 also shows the locations of possible school sites in the vicinity of Ormond Beach.

L021-3
A Revised Draft EIR was recirculated under the CEQA for an additional public review period of 60 days. Sections 1.4 and 1.5.3.2 contain additional information on this topic. The distribution list for the document is provided in Appendix A.

If you have any questions or need further clarification regarding this correspondence, please feel free to contact me directly at (805) 383-1901; or CDE Representative, Mr. George Shaw, at (805) 455-9913.

Sincerely,

Charles Weis

Charles Weis, Ph.D.
County Superintendent of Schools

CW/SM:sw

cc: Dr. Jerry Dannenberg, Superintendent, Hueneme School District
Dr. John Peglisi, Superintendent, Mesa Union School District
Dr. Nancy Carroll, Superintendent, Ocean View School District
Dr. Patrick Faverty, Superintendent, Rio School District
Dr. Darrel Taylor, Interim Superintendent, Oxnard Elementary School District
Dr. Gary Davis, Superintendent, Oxnard Union High School District
Mr. George Shaw, California Department of Education Representative
The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California
The Honorable Lois Capps, House of Representatives, 23rd District
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, House of Representatives, 24th District
The Honorable Tom McClintock, State Senate, 18th District
The Honorable Sheila Kuehl, State Senate, 23rd District
The Honorable Pedro Nava, State Assembly, 35th District
The Honorable Audra Strickland, State Assembly, 37th District
The Honorable Keith Richman, State Assembly, 38th District
The Honorable Fran Pavley, State Assembly, 41st District